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Abstract 
 
A lot of empirical and behavioral studies underline the idea of a non-flat term structure 
of subjective interest rates with a decreasing slope. Using an empirical test, this paper aims at 
identifying in individual behaviors whether agents see their psychological value of time 
decreasing or not. We show that the subjective interest rate follows a negatively sloped term 
structure. It can be parameterized using two variables, one specifying the instantaneous time 
preference, the other characterizing the slope of the term structure. A trade-off law called 
“balancing pressure law” is identified between these two parameters. We show that the term 
structure of psychological rates depends strongly on gender, but appears not to be linked with 
life expectancy. We also question the cross relationship between risk aversion and time 
preference. From a theoretical point of view, these two variables stand as two different and 
independent dimensions of choice. However, empirically, both time preference attitude and 
slope seem directly influenced by risk attitude.  
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Introduction 
 
If risk aversion is an important feature of economic and financial behaviors, the 
attitude of an agent with regard to time is also fundamental. The subjective value given to 
time, also known as the subjective interest rate or the subjective value of time, is identified as 
a core concept of the microeconomic literature. It is a fundamental parameter, which enters 
into economic or financial choices. We know that choices are comparisons between pleasures 
and pains (Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789), which 
are estimated at different times, now and in the future. The weighting factor of choices that 
makes preferences is subjective utility. The time dimension is rooted in the economic process 
of choice because different periods are considered. It is for this reason that we need to 
consider not only a subjective interest rate to discount future utility, but several subjective 
interest rates allowing the definition of a subjective or psychological discount function. There 
is a difference between the subjective interest rate, which is a variable used by an agent to 
discount his future utility, and the time preference hypothesis. The time preference hypothesis 
refers to the idea that an agent has a “preference for immediate utility compared with a future 
utility” (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 351). We assume here that the economically rational agent 
has a positive subjective interest rate. He discounts future utility.1 As a consequence, the time 
preference hypothesis implies that the rational agent (i) needs to subjectively evaluate time, 
(ii) discounts future utility and (iii) develops a set of multitemporal choices. Moreover, the 
subjective interest rate is often submitted to an additional hypothesis: it is assumed to be 
constant whatever the age of the individual or the time horizon considered in the choice. This 
is the standard micro-economic setting of individual choices. Combined with the hypothesis 
of time invariance of preferences (involving time separable utility function), it leads to the 
classical model of maximization of the sum of discounted future utilities, as introduced by 
Samuelson (1937). Individual decisions using a unique and constant subjective interest rate 
will refer to an exponential discounting function. In equilibrium models of consumption-
investment, choices are specified with regard to a representative agent, which allows the 
consideration of available aggregated variables. 
 
                                                 
1
 The hypothesis of “pervasive devaluation of the future” was presented by Ainslie and Haslam (1992, p. 59).  
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The hypothesis of a unique and constant subjective interest rate is very useful for 
further modeling and empirical tests. Using market equilibrium variables or the aggregate 
values of investment of a representative agent is easy. However, it involves a very poor view 
of intertemporal choice setting by individuals. Many empirical and behavioral studies 
underline the idea of a non-flat term structure of subjective interest rates with a decreasing 
slope. This hypothesis has to be crossed with individual behaviors. 
 
This paper aims at identifying whether agents see their psychological value of time as 
decreasing or not. We questioned a sample of 243 individuals in order to analyze their attitude 
with regard to time. They were asked to give to time different psychological values at 
different points in the future. The difficulty here is staying at the psychological value level 
and not questioning a monetary value of time. Public interest rates are social prices of time in 
a market and they appear as alternative saving or investment goods. Here, we want to 
question not the utility of saving goods or financial assets, but the intertemporal comparison 
of personal utilities (wherever they come from). The psychological value of time derives from 
the individual perception of choices between the current “self” of the individual at time t and 
his future “selves” at times t+1, t+2…We show that the subjective interest rates are specific to 
each individual. They have a decreasing form coherent with a negatively sloped term 
structure. They can be parameterized using two individual parameters, one specifying the 
immediate term preference, the other characterizing the slope. A trade-off law is documented 
between the two parameters, which appear to follow a log-log relationship common to any 
individuals. The term structure of psychological interest rates does not appear linked with life 
expectancy, but strongly depends on gender. Individual subjective time preference does not 
show a tempus fugit effect.  
 
Individual preferences are conditioned by few variables. A cross relationship between 
risk aversion and time preference is often questioned, at least on theoretical grounds. These 
two concepts stand as two different and independent dimensions. Empirically, time preference 
attitude and slope seem directly influenced by attitude with regard to risk.  
 
The following paper is divided into 5 Sections. The first presents a review of the 
literature. Section 2 introduces the concept of free time and the questionnaire. Section 3 gives 
the results and tests some assumptions. Section 4 estimates the term structure of subjective 
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interest rates. The determinant variables explaining the subjective interest rates are analyzed 
in Section 5. 
 
1-The literature 
 
Fisher (1930) introduced the concept of rate of impatience in microeconomics choices. 
Samuelson (1937) developed a normative model of intertemporal choice using the discounted 
value of expected future utility. The idea is that an individual maximizes a set of utilities at 
different current and future periods. Referring to a “time separation” hypothesis, each periodic 
and specific future utility can be discounted. Individual choice will result from the 
combination of the utility dimension (which is itself influenced by the attitude toward risk) 
and the time dimension. The individual psychological price of time, also referred to as the rate 
of impatience, is an economic variable per se needed to build economic choices. Discounting 
the consequences of future decisions is at the heart of individual behaviors according to the 
standard micro-economic theory. The agent considers globally current and future expected 
utility, the latter being forecasted using available information. Samuelson introduces an 
identical subjective rate of interest, which results in a simple exponential discounting function 
in the standard microeconomic model.  
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δ: annual constant psychological discount factor 
Ct: consumption at period t 
U(Ct): consumption utility 
 
Time is an economically valuable dimension. Von Mises (1949) recognizes the time 
preference hypothesis.2 He consequently mentions that individuals give a psychological value 
to time and their impatience rate should not be assimilated with the interest rates in the 
financial markets. Interest rates are the social price of time and are used to compare 
alternative consumption and investment opportunities. The psychological interest rate is used 
to discount subjective evaluation by individuals in their calculus, what he calls 
“economization”. For Von Mises, “The economization of time is independent of the 
                                                 
2
 Op. cit. chap 18, p. 481; “Time preference is a categorical requisite of human action”. 
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economization of economic goods and services. Even in the land of Cockaigne man would be 
forced to economize time, provided he were not immortal and not endowed with eternal youth 
and indestructible health and vigor. Although all his appetites could be satisfied immediately 
without any expenditure of labor, he would have to arrange his time schedule, as there are 
states of satisfaction which are incompatible and cannot be consummated at the same time. 
For this man, too, time would be scarce and subject to the aspect of sooner and later”. 3 The 
analysis of the variables which may explain individual time preference is very rich: remaining 
duration of life, health, youth will affect the level of the subjective interest rates. This 
approach opens the way to subjective interest rates, which are variable through time for the 
same individual according to his expected duration of life or his health. This is the first 
mention of a possible terms structure in the psychological value of time. A major theoretical 
question is set. Does intertemporal attitude depend on visceral features and is constant or, as 
suggested by Von Mises, does it depend on contingent variables?  
 
Later and independently, this theoretical hypothesis was reinforced by empirical 
research questioning the exponential discount function. Empirical tests were developed to see 
whether individual subjective interest rates are constant whatever the time horizon of the 
choice. These tests generally invalidate the idea of flat impatience rates and lead to the 
conclusion of a decreasing term structure. Thaler (1981) was among the first to sustain that 
hypothesis by questioning individuals: “Which amount in respectively 1 month, 1 year or 10 
years would you judge equivalent to 15 dollars now?” The median answers were $20 in 1 
month, $50 in 1 year, and $100 in 10 years’ time. Thaler deduced a decreasing term structure 
of impatience rate with values of 345% for the one month horizon, 220% for the one year and 
15% for the 10 years. 
 
Experimental tests of the psychological discount function have been made on human 
individuals or animals by psychologists or psychiatrists. Chung and Herrnstein (1961) draw 
the conclusion that a decreasing hyperbola fits well the time preference function of animals. 
Considering human individuals, Ainslie (1992) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) model 
discount functions such as the hyperbolic curve δ(t)=(1+α.t)-γ/t, with t being the time horizon. 
This curve gives decreasing equivalent annual interest rates. The immediate subjective 
interest rate is equal to the parameter γ. Long-term psychological rates converge toward zero.  
                                                 
3
 Op. cit., chap 5, p. 102.  
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The decreasing term structure, as suggested by a hyperbolic model, would entail 
overdiscounting the immediate future vis-à-vis the far distant future. On the other hand, a flat 
term structure would ceteris paribus result in overdiscounting the distant future. The 
characteristics of hyperbolic (or any decreasing) subjective term structure is that the long-term 
future accounts for relatively more in solving the dynamic choice problems than the short 
term future. At the extreme, a myopic individual, who considers only the current period and 
the one that follows, will need only a short-term discount rate for the next period and is not 
concerned by the time inconsistency problem for onward periods (Loewenstein et Prelec, 
1992). Laibson (1996) suggests the use of a “quasi-hyperbolic” discount function, which 
refers to two parameters: the standard discount coefficient δ and a second parameter β <1. At 
period t=1, the discount coefficient is β.δ. The following coefficients are multiplied by the 
unique β coefficients. This results in a discrete discount function {1, β.δ, βδ2, β.δ3…}. He was 
one of the first to mention that economic agents are more impatient when they undertake 
short-term arbitrage than when they make economic choices within a long-term horizon. 
 
The theoretical problem with a non-flat term structure of psychological interest rates is 
their time inconsistency. The sequences of economic choices are ex ante incoherent, which is 
not rational in the homo economicus setting. The optimal choices that are calculated for 
period t using a discount factor δ(t) are not the same as those that will be preferred one period 
later using a factor δ(t-1) and discounted. Strotz (1956) underlined that ex ante the two 
sequences of consumption plans are dynamically incoherent. Time consistent setting of 
present and future consumptions using the available information implies that individuals 
cannot be irrational. Therefore the (only) simple solution is that psychological interest rates 
should be constant. However, in a situation of dynamic time inconsistent plans, intertemporal 
choices can also be analyzed as a conflict between different economically calculating agents, 
existing in the same individual. As Laibson (1996) points out, the “self” who decides at time 
t, enters into a strategic game with the optimizing “self” at time t+1. The multiple “selves” 
model is a way to cope with the “time inconsistency” consequence involved in non-flat 
psychological interest rates. Multiple “selves” is a psychological concept that allows the 
characterization of the peculiar nature of intertemporal choices (Frederick et al., 2002). On the 
other hand, time inconsistency may also derive from evolving preference functions such as 
“changing taste” preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
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Thaler and Shefrin (1981) introduced the concept of multiple selves in a non-
formalized way, which did not lead to a testable hypothesis. They analyzed the consistency of 
temporal choices in a theory of “self-control”. The agent has two “selves” in a conflict. The 
same individual is assumed to be at the same time a “planner” who organizes his 
consumption-investment choices looking at the long term and a myopic agent making choices 
on the very short-term horizon (a “doer”). The “doer” optimizes looking only at the next 
period. A conflict arises between the two different series of preferences. Thaler and Shefrin 
(1981) draw an analogy with agency conflict between manager and shareholders in a firm. 
The agent’s “self control” is a way to reduce the conflict between the planner’s self and the 
doer’s self. The only way for the planner to modify the myopic doer’s behavior is to control 
his behavior. This can be done either by modifying his preferences, or by imposing 
constraints or commitment rules to curb his choices. The devices to curb the behavior are 
classically incentives or rules. For instance, looking at the trade-off between consumption and 
investment, incentives may influence the behavior of the myopic agent by giving a strong 
moral and ethical value to saving. Self-limitation rules may be set to limit consumption and 
favor abstinence (equivalent to appetite suppressants for people who want to follow a diet 
regime).  
 
Kahneman (1994) introduces a distinction between “decision utility”, which results 
from choices consciously made by an individual, more precisely the consequences of his 
choices, and “experienced utility”. Experienced utility stands at the global level of an 
individual’s well being. The difference between the two refers to “basic” needs and the 
psychological concerns of human beings (Frederick et al., 2002). In a behavioral approach, 
there are indirect utility elements that are exogenously given, received or inherited from the 
context of the individual, or they may also be an indirect consequence of his choices. These 
elements will depend on the context of the individual, on previous choices, on pure random 
externalities and on tensions between the different “selves” that make a personality and a 
character. The individual context links past to future choices. In the economic dimension, the 
difference between “decision utility” and “experienced utility” is a difference in linkage with 
a decision made at time t; it suggests that the instantaneous utility function is not constant. 
 
In a behavioral approach, “time separability” exists and means that the individual can 
identify the instantaneous utilities from which he can build his global utility: global utility is 
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“the temporal integral of some transformation of instant utility”.4 Temporal aggregation 
means that the individual can compare two instantaneous utilities at different time periods by 
evaluating which one has the most important hedonic value. We are still in a psychological 
economic rationale of preferences. Kahnenam and Riis (2005, p. 8) add that “time is the last 
human resource of his life and find a way to use it at best is an important goal both for the 
individual involved in his well-being and at the level of social choices aiming at human well-
being”. This leads to the idea of time preference or positive psychological time value. This 
also entails questions on the upper limit with regard to aggregating future instantaneous 
utilities. The end of human life imposes a limit in the definition of his time personality. The 
successors of the agent (his children, global society…) are not his economic “selves”. His 
identity will in the end die and be replaced by other actors and other preferences. This does 
not imply that the agent is indifferent to what can happen after his death. He can derive utility 
in passing on wealth or economic goods. His successors (if any and ex ante identified) will 
have different personalities and preferences.  
 
The idea of identity involves consciousness of the structure of one’s preference: Is the 
agent conscious of the stability/instability of his tastes? Am I the same now as I was 
yesterday? Will I be the same tomorrow? There is as much strength of differentiation and of 
continuity between the “selves” of the same individual within time as there are between 
different agents who are close to each other and living at the same time in the same social 
group. In analyzing economic behavior, discounting temporal preferences is as rational as 
socially aggregating individual preferences. According to Frederick (2006): “It may be just as 
rational to discount one’s (self) future utility, as to discount the utility of another distinct 
individual, because the distinction between the stage of one’s life may be as deep as the 
distinction between individuals”.5The theoretical questions raised by intertemeporal 
discounting are numerous and are listed in Soman et al. (2005) or Rohde (2010) for an 
axiomatic point of view. Experimental studies have privileged individual choices and 
answers. In that sense, they convey more information than looking at aggregated market data. 
Feather and Shaw (1999) try to evaluate the leisure opportunity cost of beach sports. This cost 
is traditionally estimated to be a fraction of the wage rate. A problem arises for individuals 
who are not employed and have no observable wages. The demand for leisure will depend 
jointly on the pure time preference and on the wage rate. The time devoted to work is not a 
                                                 
4
 Cf. Kahneman et al. (1997), p. 388. 
5
 Cf. art cit. p.674. 
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discretionary continuous variable that an agent may easily optimize. Feather and Shaw 
underline that the “value of time” is not only given by a trade-off with the wage rate; it also 
depends on other hedonic variables. An estimate of the “shadow price of leisure time” is 
proposed by Lew and Larson (2005) in their evaluation of the discretionary wage. This 
concept assumes that the agent stands at his equilibrium between work and leisure and can 
make a trade-off. The evaluation of the leisure consumption is stochastic and is empirically 
estimated with regard to the consumption of leisure on Californian beaches. The implicit 
prices of leisure time are very different. They are high for employed or over-employed 
individuals, and lower for retired, unemployed and students. Warner and Pleeter (2001) 
analyzed the choices made by 60,000 American army members who were offered the choice 
of either a life annuity or an immediate indemnity on leaving the army. The actuarial rate used 
to define the annual cash flow was 17.5%, at a time when the interest rate offered in the 
financial market was 7%. The annual cash flow choice appeared financially better than the 
immediate payment. The empirical study showed that half of officers and around 10% of 
soldiers and civil employees chose the annual installments. This result evidences a very strong 
individual preference for the present time. The estimates of the psychological interest rate of 
army members by Warner and Pleeter were between 24% and 42%.  
 
Shapiro (2005) made an empirical study of American individuals who benefited from 
a free allocation of “food stamps”. These subsidies are granted monthly. It was shown that the 
caloric consumption of those receiving the food stamps decreased by between 10 and 15% 
during the month. This implies a strong short-term preference. Calibrating a time preference 
function of a logarithmic agent, Shapiro obtains a daily subjective time discount coefficient of 
0.996. Under the hypothesis of an exponential discount function, this is equivalent to an 
annual discount coefficient of 0.23 on a one-year horizon, i.e. a subjective interest rate of 
320% per year. This estimate is viewed as too strong, so Shapiro questions the exponential 
subjective impatience hypothesis and uses the Laibson (1996) quasi-hyperbolic function to 
calibrate the data. With an estimated β of 0.96, he concludes that a hyperbolic function is 
better suited to high interest rates on the short-term end of the time preference curve. Kurz et 
al. (1973), using a simple questionnaire, concludes that the annual subjective interest rate is 
within the 36% to 76% range. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) also asked a very simple question: 
“Which money bonus do you want now instead of a 100 dollars bonus in a one year’s time?”. 
They highlight the influence of conditioning variables such as age, income level and marital 
status. They insist on the relationship between age and maturity: young people have to learn 
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and internalize the technique of behavioral self-control. Social categories are also important in 
explaining the subjective interest rate. Thaler and Shefrin evoke a decreasing structure of 
subjective interest rates. In the long term, agents are relatively more patient: for instance, I 
prefer two apples within 101 days from now than one apple within 100 days. However, in a 
short-term view, the rate of impatience is different: I prefer one apple now than two apples 
tomorrow. Frederick et al. (2002) collected the estimates of subjective discount factors 
resulting from thirty experimental studies. They crossed these subjective values of time with 
the time horizon of choices ranging from the very short-term (10 dollars now versus X dollars 
tomorrow) to the very long-term (10 dollars now versus Y dollars in 10 years). The average 
discount factors (average subjective interest rate) showed an increasing (decreasing) structure 
with the time horizon term structure. Frederick et al. point out that questions based on money 
comparisons may be polluted with the idea of the interest rate, which is a social and 
marketable price of time and not a subjective time preference used by individuals to set their 
personal choices. 
 
Many experiments and studies have tried to identify the conditioning variable 
explaining individual time preference attitudes. The influencing variables are: 
- Attitude of smokers: smokers have a psychological price of time, which appear higher 
as compared with non smokers (Baker et al., 2003, Kirby and Petry, 2004, Ohmura et 
al., 2005). 
- Alcohol dependency: alcoholics have a larger psychological price of time. Serious 
alcoholics discount future gains to a greater extent than do former alcoholics (Petry, 
2001, Bjork et al., 2004). The same is true for drug addicts (Bretteville-Jensen, 1999, 
Kirby and Petry, 2004). 
- Wealth level: rich households present subject interest rates that are 3 to 5% lower than 
households with low income (Lawrance, 1991).  
- Age: Young people are moderately patient (i.e. they have a low psychological price of 
time). Patience increases with age and senior people have a larger psychological price 
of time (i.e. a lower discount factor) (Green et al., 1994). Life expectancy appears to 
influence and attenuate the relationship with age.  
- Cognitive ability: Frederick (2005) shows the influence of cognitive abilities. In his 
test, he uses an index of “cognitive reflection” (CRT, “Cognitive Reflection Test”), 
which spans the difference of behavior between individuals who behave intuitively 
without taking the time for reflection and those who act taking the time to analyze and 
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evaluate choices. The CRT index was crossed with both the dimensions of time 
preference and risk aversion using a sample of 3,428 respondents. A positive 
relationship between the CRT index and patience was highlighted: people showing 
high cognitive reflection are also more patient. A link was identified with risk attitude: 
people with a high CRT index are more prone to risk. 
- Gender is a fundamental characteristic in the psychological valuation of time. For 
instance, Frederick (2005) shows that women have a lower CRT index (correlated 
with impatience and a higher time preference) than men.  
- Risk aversion also seems to play a role. According to Frederick (2005), there is a 
common factor behind time preference and risk aversion. This hypothesis is important 
because it would mean that the two dimensions of risk aversion and time preference 
may be linked in human choices. 
 
2-The concept of free time and the questionnaire  
 
One important issue when dealing with individual time preference is knowing whether 
questions and choices have to be set in monetary units or not. Using a money equivalent 
places the individual in a framework of consumption power and leads to an underestimation 
of the answer. People are systematically exposed to confusion with saving decisions and 
interest rates. Comparing amounts of money now and later in the future is a saving choice and 
that decision is polluted by the existing possibility of deferring power consumption using 
existing market interest rates. When the outcomes are monetary, a normative behavior is 
based on Irving Fisher’s assertion that rational decision makers will borrow or lend so that 
their marginal rate of substitution between present and future money will equal the market 
interest rate.” As Read (2004) points out, “discount rates that exceed the opportunity cost of 
capital represent irrational behavior”. The pure time preference is independent of the content 
of current and future choices between consumption and saving. We need to compare the 
utility of consuming a product now and the utility of consuming the same product in the 
future. Comparison of “moneyed choices” refers or suggests interest rates and introduces 
confusion between the psychological price of alternative utility choices and the social price of 
time. Cairns and Van der Poole (2000, 2002) first used questionnaires with questions 
comparing amounts of money. Later they privileged studies without any reference to money 
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and compared dealing with a disease now with the possibility of deferring its onset further 
into the future.  
  
The psychological value of time is the discounted factor applied to choice involving the 
future. This element is crucial in the dimension of intertemporal comparison at different 
times. The valuation ratio of two (utility) choices does not have a value in itself; it has a value 
relative to individual choices. It is not a general and shared price; it is a subjective ratio that 
should not be expressed in monetary units. Time is an open window for present and future 
choices and, possibly, future utility. Deferring or accelerating these choices expresses the 
personal value given to time. The idea of “free time” is used to identify an extra opportunity 
opened up to individuals to make new choices now or in the future. It does not say anything 
about the content of these choices. When comparing two apples in the future and one apple 
now, comparison develops within the framework of the utility of a given choice, i.e. to eat an 
apple. This involves the specific utility of an apple for someone who is fond of apples or that 
of another individual who hates apples. The idea of marginal free time opens up the space for 
new choices and additional utility independently of the content of the choice and the utility of 
the decision made within this new deferred opportunity to act economically. This free time is 
a window through which to enter into new economical and behavioral choices. It is not per se 
a set of substantial choices. It may have no value; it is not automatically linked to the 
consumption of goods, additional time to work or salary. The unit is “one hour of free time”, 
not its value in euros. This “free hour” is given once in the time horizon and is compared with 
other amount of “free time” given once in the near or far future. To our knowledge this 
concept has not been used in the previous empirical literature. This approach is not exposed to 
the “changing taste” hypothesis which states that a comparison between utilities linked to the 
same good at different time can be explained by a possible evolution of the intrinsic utility of 
the good through time. This is the “Horse and the Rider” metaphor mentioned by Soman et al. 
(2005). Rational agents can forecast the evolution of their future utility function. However, a 
projection bias is identified by Loewenstein et al. (2003) who explain that the agents make 
their future tastes similar to their current tastes. The idea of “free time” disentangles time 
preference from the other factors that drive people to devalue future outcomes.  
 
An additional hour of free time at period t is compared with an additional hour of free 
time later. The hypothesis of time preference means that an hour of free time now is more 
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valuable than one hour of free time later in the future. The relative ratio between the two gives 
an implicit price, which is the individual’s subjective interest rate.  
 
The questionnaire 
 
The questions and a preliminary form were firstly tested on marketing students of the 
master’s degree of the University Paris Sorbonne (Jolibert and Jourdan, 2006). These answers 
were not considered in the subsequent main test. The form itself is structured in four blocks of 
questions. The questionnaire was anonymously submitted to individuals. The first block of 
questions (block S) are questions about the characteristics of the respondent. Characteristics 
are unambiguous: date of birth, gender, place of birth, native language…(see Annex 1) 
Questions related to attitude and behavior cover the perception of time, the importance of 
passing on something to one’s children; three questions are devoted to attitudes regarding risk 
and risk aversion (S21, S22, S23). Two questions propose a traditional choice between 
playing an uncertain lottery and a certain income. Personal attitude vis-à-vis the risk is 
questioned on a scale between risk-lovers and absolute risk averters. 
 
The block A questions introduce the idea of “free time”. What we want to analyze is 
the attitude vis-à-vis a pure space of time open to any economical or behavioral choice. When 
giving the form to respondents, we introduced the questionnaire by saying: “imagine that a 
day is now 25 hours instead of 24, what is the importance of that extra new hour for you?”. 
We want to identify individual preference for an extra space of choices before these choices 
are effectively made. In that sense, we do not need to rely on rational assumptions linked to 
choices. Respondents are faced with choices and the valuation of their utility. We want to 
compare the preferences of this extra window of space for new choices between, for instance, 
now and X years in the future. Respondents were asked to compare a period of free time now 
and a period of free time at a given time in the future. We recognize that this setting makes 
two implicit behavioral assumptions: (i) the additional value of one awarded “free hour” is 
symmetric to the value of one free hour subtracted from the daily time horizon (“imagine that 
a day is now 23 hours instead of 24…”); (ii) the imagination of each one has to fill this new 
extra space of time. The way each one may fill this new pure time depends on the context of 
an economic choice led by scarcity of time (Von Mises, 1949). The way someone imagine 
leisure for instance is not the same if he is retired or if we focus to active people facing a 
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leisure/work choice. Busy executives may systematically view “free time“ as leisure. Here, 
fortunately our sample is composed of students and retired people and not of executives.  
 
 
A1.-Would you prefer 1 extra hour of free time now or 2 hours of free time in 1 year’s 
time? 
 
A2. -Would you prefer 1 extra hour of free time now or 5 hours of free time in 5 years’ 
time? 
 
A3. -Would you prefer 1 extra hour of free time in 1 year’s time or 5 hours of free time in 6 
years’ time? 
 
A4. -Would you prefer 2 extra hours of free time in 10 years’ time or a set of 1 hour of free 
time now and 1 hour of free time in 20 years’ time? 
 
A5. -Would you prefer 4 extra hours of free time in 10 years’ time or a set of 1 hour of free 
time now and 1 hour of free time in 20 years’ time? 
 
A6. -Would you prefer 2 extra hours of free time in 5 years’ time or a set of 1 hour of free 
time now and 1 hour of free time in 20 years’ time? 
 
A7. -Would you prefer a set of 1 extra hour of free time now and 1 hour of free time in 20 
years’ time or 2 hours of free time in 10 years’ time?  
 
A8 -Would you prefer to have in 10 years’ time 2 hours of extra free time for yourself or to 
get in 10 years’ time a set of one hour of free time for yourself and 1 hour of free time for one 
of your relatives? 
Table 1 – Block A questions 
(Answers with 3 alternative choices: first alternative, second alternative and indifference 
between the two choices. Indifferent choices would not be considered in the analysis)  
 
Block B is a series of six questions on the relative value of one hour of free time in the 
future compared with one hour of free time now. Nine ordinal choices are proposed linked 
with a range of values expressed in number of hours. For instance, item 3 refers to a range of 
[2 to 6] hours. Respondents were asked to compare one hour of free time now and X hours in 
the future. By checking item 3, the respondent is showing that he considers one hour of free 
time now to be equivalent to 2 to 6 hours in the future. Different time horizons are questioned: 
1 year ahead, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, 30 years and 50 years corresponding respectively to 
questions B1 to B6. Questions B7 and B8 deal with curvature comparing a package of 15 
hours of free time at two time horizons and 15 hours awarded at a medium term horizon. 
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Questions B1-B6 are as follows: One extra hour of free time now is equivalent to how 
many hours of free time in 1 year’s time (respectively 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, 30 years 
and 50 years)? The answer should be one of the 9 ordered choices: 
1- Less than 1h in 1year (respectively 5, 10, 20, 30, 50 years) 
2- Between 1h and 2h in 1y (id) 
3- Between 2h and 6h in 1y (id) 
4- Between 6h and 12h in 1y (id) 
5- Between 12h and 22h in 1y (id) 
6- Between 22h and 36h in 1y (id) 
7- Between 36h and 52h in 1y (id) 
8- Between 52h and 78h in 1y (id) 
9- More than 78h in 1y (id) 
 
The same questions were submitted again after the respondent was asked to read a 
mortality table. In the block C questions, people had to compute their life expectancy taking 
into account their date of birth and their gender. Each respondent had to calculate the probable 
year of his death and his expected remaining duration of life from the present day. Then, after 
being informed of his true average life expectancy, questions identical to B1-B8 were asked 
again (questions C6-C13). 
 
The block C questions will be used to cope with the problem of perception of time. 
The respondent may answer according not to the objective duration of time but his own 
perception of time. Zauberman et al. (2009) claim that seemingly impatient choices and 
hyperbolic individual discounting, may be explained by the subjective perception of time. A 
discrepancy appears in empirical test and the subjective sensitivity to an objective variation in 
time is low. The Weber-Fechner law states that the relationship between the objective time 
change and its subjective perception follows a logarithmic function. This one contracts the 
objective time stimulus (Zauberman et al., 2009).  
 
Data 
 
The sample was put together from answers from 243 individuals. Two different 
categories of people were questioned using the questionnaire form. Most of the respondents 
were students from the Paris Sorbonne University. They are following management and 
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business economics studies and are in the graduation year of their bachelor’s or master’s 
degree. A sub sample of retired people aged 58 or more were interviewed in the French city of 
Reims (26 people) and by sending the questionnaires by mail to retired men and women in 
rural areas of France (32 respondents).6 They were members of a non-profit organization for 
retired people.7 Their average age was 67.1 years. The student sub-sample (185 people) was 
on average 22.1 years old. The two sub-samples are very distinct since we did not have any 
respondents born in the 1958-1976 period.  
 
The questionnaire was answered during the academic year 2007-2008. The global 
average age of the whole sample was 32.8 years. Of the total sample, 58% were women. Only 
56 respondents (23%) had children (average number of children was 2.03); 47 were 
grandparents. 88 of the respondents (36.5%) had thought about passing on something to their 
children. Of the others, 106 (44%) said they would think about it. However, a minority of 
19% claimed that they were not motivated by passing on anything to their children. Globally, 
49% of the individuals considered that they had something valuable (i.e. capital or 
knowledge) to pass on to their children.  
 
 average standard dev min max N 
Date of birth 1974.18 19.64 1920 1988 243 
Gender (0:men/1 women) 0.59 0.49 0 1 243 
Number of children 2.03 1.06 0 5 56 
Ability to speak another foreign 
language fluently (0:yes/1:no)  
0.55 0.49 0 1 240 
Currently a smoker (0:yes/1:no) 0.85 0.35 0 1 240 
Education level 4.16 1.14 1 6 242 
Monthly financial expenses 
category (1 to 6) 
2.29 1.42 1 6 240 
Perception of the importance of 
free time (ordered from 1, no to 
6, of the utmost importance) 
4.12 1.22 1 6 241 
Financial planning horizon (1 to 
4) 
1.73 0.88 1 4 243 
Planning to pass on capital and 
knowledge to children or other 
relatives (0:yes/1:no) 
0.63 0.48 0 1 241 
Importance of passing on 
capital and knowledge (from 1 
2.60 1.21 1 6 242 
                                                 
6
 A total of 250 questionnaires were distributed by the Fédération des Ainés Ruraux to their members.  
7
 I would like to thank for their support Mrs Renate Gossart, President of the association “Les panthères grises” 
located in Reims and Mrs Delphine Guillaume in charge of internal communication at the Fédération Nationale 
des Ainés Ruraux, www.ainesruraux.org. 
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to 6) 
Perception of risk attitude  3.40 1.34 1 6 243 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of the sample 
(Education level: answers from 1 (autodidact) to 6 (master’s degree); Monthly financial 
expenses by ordered categories: 1: below 300€ up to 6: more than 2500€; Financial planning 
horizon ordered from 1 to 4: 1 in coming months, 4 over the next 10 years; Importance of 
passing on capital and knowledge: 1, null, to 6, huge; Risk attitude: ordinal value from 1, risk 
lover, to 6, absolute risk rejection.) 
 
3-Results 
 
3.1 Qualitative time preference 
 
Questions A1 to A8 aim at testing qualitatively the time preference hypothesis by 
advancing two propositions. The respondent can state a preference for one or the other or can 
say that the two are equivalent. If the answer is indifference, it is withdrawn from the data. 
We only consider choices expressed as preferences. Question A1 tests the time preference 
hypothesis by asking the preference of individuals between 1 hour of free time now (0) and 2 
hours of free time 1 year ahead (1). The average answer (indifference excluded) is 0.33. This 
is significantly above zero. The idea of a trade-off between the present and the future can be 
accepted if a price exists, i.e. a preference of 1 hour now vs. 2 hours tomorrow. The test of 
equality of the A1 answer compared to a random average answer of 0.5 is rejected. However, 
the t-test assumes a normal distribution. This assumption is weak. We also consider a sign test 
(proportion below 0.5=0.64, p-val:0.00). It confirms the previous one. 
 
A2 is the same question with a trade-off further in the future (1 hour now vs. 5 hours 
in 5 years). The average answer is 0.34. This is significantly different and lower than a 
random 0.5 answer. 
 
The A1 vs. A2 test allows the checking of a difference in pricing the future. The null 
shows that the two means are not different. A p-value above the usual significance levels does 
not reject the null. The difference is not significant (p-value of the t-test: 0.00). This test is 
reliable because the A1-A2 difference is normal (Jarque-Bera statistic=64.90; p:0.00). This 
means that 2 hours in 1 year’s time are equivalent (not different from) 5 hours in 5 years’ 
time. The sign test gives 82% of zero differences. The implicit discount factor (5/2=2.5) is 
26% a year (for a 1-5y horizon).  
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 A1 corr. A2 corr. A1 vs. A2 A3 corr. A2 vs.A3 
N  209 217 209 191 187 
average 0.33 0.34 0.00 0.45 0.08 
std dev 0.47 0.47 0.42 0.55 0.41 
      
t-test -5.39 -4.94 0.48 -1.38 2.65 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.17 0.01 
      
Sign test      
Proportion 
below 0.5 
0.67 0.66 0.82 0.55 0.82 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Table 3 – Results of the block A questions (I)  
(corr.: answers corrected to eliminate indifferent choices; only 0/1 answers are taken into 
account; question A1 is comparison of 1 extra hour of free time now or 2 hours of free time in 
1 year’s time; question A2 is comparison of 1 extra hour of free time now or 5 hours of free 
time in 5 years’ time; question A3 is comparison of 1 extra hour of free time in 1 year’s time 
or 5 hours of free time in 6 years’ time; A1 vs. A2 is the difference of A1 and A2 dummy 
vectors (similar for A2 vs. A3) 
 
Question A3 is the same as A2 but put forward by 1 year. The average answer is 0.45. 
The t-test and the sign test show that the answer is not different compared with a random 
answer of 0.50. It means there is indifference between the two terms of choices suggested in 
question A3. We compared the answers to A2 to check whether the results are the same. A3 is 
significantly different from A2. According to the t-test, the hypothesis of difference is 
accepted, but it is rejected looking at the sign test. These results are contradictory. The 
statistic A3 minus A2 is normally distributed (JB=60.16, p:0.00); we privileged the t-test. 
This means that when the choice is put forward by 1 year, the preference for the time closer to 
the present date decreases. If the time preference had been the same, i.e. if exponential 
discounting were true, delaying the same choice by 1 year should have given the same result 
in questions A2 and A3. Here, the trade-off price is not the same. That result suggests a non-
flat subjective interest rate. A decreasing curb will make the short-term side of the trade-off 
less attractive and place a larger weight on the long-term proposition. It is for this reason that 
we get an average answer of 0.45 for question A2 and above 0.37 for question A3. However, 
the two sets of choices are still coherent. The Spearman correlation between A2 and A3 is 
significant and positive (+0.65, p-val:0.00). 
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Question A4 tests the curvature of the time preference function. It asks whether 
individuals prefer 2 hours of free time within 10 years or a package of 1 hour now and 1 hour 
within 20 years. If (naïve) linearity prevails, under a flat curve, the two terms are equivalent, 
so the answer should be the average of 0 and 1, i.e. 0.5. We get an average answer of 0.66. 
The t-test against 0.5 and the sign test confirm this result to be significantly above a 50% 
probability. By preferring the package, individuals may have a decreasing time curve 
preference, i.e. a decreasing subjective price of time. 
 
Question A5 modifies the term of the curvature. It gives a greater weight to the 
medium term choice (doubling it to 4 hours against 2 hours in question A4). The terms of the 
package remain the same. The preference for the medium-term time horizon choice (choice 0) 
increases logically with an average answer of 0.34. Referring both to the t-test and the sign 
test, this is significantly lower than 0.5. Question A5 is not meaningful in analyzing curvature 
because the relative terms are not comparable and not linear in the time horizon. However, it 
confirms that individuals are time rational. The choice (0) in A5 is logically better than the 
one proposed in A4. Using linear approximation and the results from A4 and A5, it means 
that to get indifference between X hours in 10 years’ time and a package of 2 hours (one now 
and one in 20 years), we should give (0.66-0.5)x(4-2)/(0.66-0.34)=1.00 hour more. This 
means 3.00 hours in 10 years’ time compares with a set of 2 hours now and in 20 years’ time.  
 
Question A6 is another way to test the curvature. The choice is similar to A5. The 
package is the same, but the medium term proposal is now 2 hours within 5 years (instead of 
10 years in question A4). We expected that individuals with a preference for the present 
would choose the first answer compared with question A4. The average value is 0.39 
compared with 0.66 in question A4. This is significantly below the random average answer of 
0.50.  
 
 A4 corr. A5 corr. A6 corr. A4 vs. A6 A5 vs. A6 
N  173 173 175 157 163 
average 0.66 0.34 0.39 0.25 0.05 
std dev 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.40 
      
      
t-test 4.41 -4.59 -2.86 6.66 1.58 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 
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Sign test      
Proportion 
below 0.5 
0.34 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.85 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 4 – Results of block A questions (II)  
(corr.: answers corrected to eliminate indifferent choices; only 0/1 answers are taken into 
account; question A4 is comparison of 2 extra hours of free time in 10 years’ time or a set of 1 
hour of free time now and 1 hour of free time in 20 years’ time; question A5 is comparison of 
4 extra hours of free time in 10 years’ time or a set of 1 hour of free time now and 1 hour of 
free time in 20 years’ time; question A6 is comparison of 2 extra hours of free time in 5 years’ 
time or a set of 1 hour of free time now and 1 hour of free time in 20 years’ time; A4 vs. A6 is 
the difference of A4 and A6 dummy vectors (similar for A5 vs. A6) 
 
We will now consider the difference A4 vs. A6; it is normally distributed (JB=10.14, 
p:0.01). The difference between A6 and A4 is significant. The results are not the same as 
comparing A6 answers to those to the A5 question. When testing the hypothesis of different 
means between A6 and A5, we reject it. Using a sign test, we have a different conclusion with 
an average probability of an identical median of 85%. We will accept the conclusion of the t-
test on the basis that data are normally distributed (JB=78.82, p:0.00) and that the sign test is 
less robust. This means that 4 hours in 10 years’ time are equivalent to 2 hours within 5 years. 
The psychological (annual) interest rate for the 5-10 year horizon that emerges is, therefore, 
14.9%. This is lower than the 26% average subjective rate for the 1-5 year horizon. 
 
We can mix the A4 and A6 results and use a linear approximation to find indifference 
between 2 hours in the future and the package (1h now + 1h in 20 years’ time). We have: 
(0.66-0.5) x (10-5)/(0.66-0.39) = 2.96 years. This means that 2 hours in 7.96 years’ time are 
equivalent to the package and the package is equivalent to 3.00 hours in 10 years’ time (see 
above). The variation between 7.96 and 10 years is 2.04 years for an increase of 1.00 hours of 
free time.  
 
Question A7 is identical to A4 but presented in reverse order. The idea here is to test if 
respondents are coherent. The answers should be strictly opposite to those of A4. We inverted 
the A7 answers to get an average value of 0.54. This is not significantly different from 0.5 (in 
contrast with the A4 question). The test of the difference between A4 and inverted A7 shows 
a significant and unexpected difference according to the t-test. However, the t-test should be 
disregarded insofar as the A4 vs. inverted A7 variable is not normally distributed (Jarque-
Bera=1.53, p:0.46). The sign test shows no significant difference. The Spearman rank 
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correlation coefficient between A4 and inverted A7 is 0.43. This is significantly positive 
(p=0.00). Hopefully, the same respondents are giving the same answer to similar questions in 
the questionnaire.  
 
Question A8 is a test of altruism. After correction for indifference, the average value is 
0.72, closer to 1 (altruistic attitude) than to 0 (personal individualism). The test vs. a random 
0.5 value is significant. The Spearman coefficient was calculated to cross with curvature 
(question A4). The coefficient is 0.01. This is non significant (p=0.30). Altruism does not 
seem to be linked with curvature, i.e. temporality in the subjective price of time. These are 
two separate dimensions of human behavior.  
 
 A7 inv. A7inv. vs. A4 A8 corr. 
N  177 157 183 
average 0.54 0.14 0.72 
std dev 0.50 0.52 0.45 
    
t-test 1.28 -3.34 6.47 
p-val 0.20 0.00 0.00 
    
Sign test    
Proportion below 
0.5 (or equal to 0) 
0.55 0.71 0.28 
p-val 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Table 5 – Results of the block A questions (III)  
(inv.: answers are corrected to eliminate indifferent answers and are inverted; corr.: corrected 
to eliminate indifferent choices; only 0/1 answers are taken into account; question A4 is 
comparison of 2 extra hours of free time in 10 years’ time or a set of 1 hour of free time now 
and 1 hour of free time in 20 years’ time; question A5 is comparison of a set of 1 extra hour 
of free time now and 1 hour of free time in 20 years’ time or 2 hours of free time in 10 years’ 
time; question 8 is, in 10 years’ time, comparison of 2 hours of extra free time for yourself or 
to get in 10 years’ time a set of one hour of free time for yourself and 1 hour of free time for 
one of your relatives) 
 
3.2 Quantitative time preference evaluation 
 
The direct price of time is tested through questions B1 to B6 considering the “price” of 
one hour of “free time” at different time horizons 1y, 5y, 10y, 20y, 30y and 50y. A measure 
of the subjective price of time is built considering the increase in the relative value of one 
hour of free time now and one hour later. If the subjective price of that hour increases, it 
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means that the time has a cost. We compared the individual answers to question B1 with the 
average answer to questions B2 to B6. If an individual answers, for instance, 2 to question B1, 
it means he gives a value of 1 to 2 h of free time in 1 year in the future compared with for one 
hour of free time now. If the average answer to the same question, but deferred forward in 
time (question B2), is 4, it means than the relative ratio of his personal time value is 6 to 9 
hours compared to one hour now. We calculated the (possibly) negative slope of the 
subjective interest rate as the difference between the B1 answer and the average relative ratio 
resulting from questions B2 to B6. For instance, the previous respondent will yield a value of 
-2 (i.e. 2 at question B1 minus 4 at question B2); this shows a time preference attitude with 
deferred free time having less value than a near current free time opportunity. If the average 
difference is negative, this indicates globally a positive price for time (or a preference for 
immediacy). Looking at the answers, the average value of the subjective price for time 
indicator is effectively negative (-1.49) and significantly different from null. The answer is 
the same with the “informed” set of respondents. Questions C6 to C11 correspond exactly to 
questions B1-B6. The answer to question C6 was compared in the same way to the average 
answers considering a deferred horizon from 5 to 50 years (i.e. questions C7 to C11). The 
average value of the informed price of time indicator is significantly negative (-1.48).  
 
Questions B1 Average time 
value B2 to B6 
C6 Average time 
value C7-C11 
N  228 207 225 207 
average 2.24 -1.49 2.23 -1.48 
std dev 1.65 1.65 1.70 1.75 
     
t-test  -13.04  -12.14 
p-val  0.00  0.00 
Table 6 – Results of block B and C questions  
(Each individual question is comparison of one extra hour of free time now and its equivalent 
number of hours of free time in respectively 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, 30 years and 
50 years’ period of time; answers are pre-coded within 9 ordered ranges; the set of questions 
B1-B6 is asked before delivering new information, the set of questions C6-C11 is asked after; 
the delivery of new information; new information is the expectancy life table of French 
population and the calculation by the respondent himself of his expected date of death; 
average time value is for each individual the difference between the average answer to 
question B2 to B6 and his answer to question B1, a negative figure means an increase of the 
value of time with a longer horizon; same for average answers to deferred horizon C7-C11 
and question C6) 
 
  
23 
When informed of his true average life expectancy, the individual does not seem to 
modify his answer regarding his subjective price of time. The score decreases from 2.24 
(question B1) to 2.23 (question C6). The difference between questions B1 and C6 is not 
significant (t-test=-0.15, p:0.88). The same is true for the subjective price of time before and 
after (t-test=-0.13, p:0.89). The two scores of subjective price of time show a strong 
correlation (Pearson correlation of +0.75, p:0.00). Salient and objective information given on 
time delay does not change the structure of the answers. We draw the conclusion that 
objective information on time does not modify its individual perception. Contrary to 
Zauberman et al. (2009) our result does not seem to be contaminated by a time perception 
effect. The decreasing slope of the individual term structure of psychological rates seems 
strong.  
4-The term structure of subjective time preference 
 
We calculated the average answer to the subjective price of time. Each question can be 
answered from checking ordinal values from 1 (a future free hour has a lower price than the 
current free time hour) up to 9 (i.e. one free time hour in the future has less value than 45 
seconds today). Answer 1 is economically irrational in terms of time preference. It means a 
preference for the future compared to the present. It could also mean that the respondent did 
not understand the question. 
 
The integer answers from 1 to 9 are trade-off relative values. The average ordinal 
answers to each question have been converted into subjective interest rates using the mid-
range value. For instance, if a given individual answers 4 to question B2, he says that he will 
ask for between 6 and 12 hours of future free time 5 years ahead to be equivalent to one hour 
just now. Taking the mid-point of 9 hours in 5 years’ time, we derive an implicit subjective 
price of time of 55.18% per year.8 
 
Taking the average value of the choices of the individuals, we obtain a collective time 
value preference. Table 7 shows the average answers with regard to the 6 time horizons. The 
structure of the average psychological interest rates clearly decreases with the time horizon. 
The short-term rate is 135.31% (1 year ahead); it decreases to 5.80% (50 years horizon). The 
                                                 
8
 Solving the equation 9)1( 5 =+ x . 
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data collected after delivering objective information on life expectancy are similar. The term 
structure of psychological interest rates decreases from 117.53% to 5.97%. 
 
Horizon (years) 1 5 10 20 30 50 
Panel A Before information      
Av. ordinal answer 2.3904 2.9248 3.4509 4.0045 4.3756 4.9074 
Av. number of future hours for one 
free time hour now 
2.4759 3.8119 6.2545 9.0360 12.0045 16.2593 
Implicit subjective interest rate 1.4759 0.3069 0.2012 0.1163 0.0864 0.0574 
Panel B After information      
Av. ordinal answer 2.4044 2.9381 3.4395 3.9452 4.3052 4.9761 
Av. number of future hours for one 
free time hour now 
2.5111 3.8451 6.1973 8.7260 11.4413 16.8086 
Implicit subjective interest rate 1.5111 0.3091 0.2001 0.1144 0.0846 0.0581 
Table 7 – Estimate of average subjective interest rates 
(Average ordinal: average of answers from 1 to 9 without corrections of outliers; Average 
number of future hours: number of future hours equivalent to one hour now calculated from 
the average answer by interpolating the mid-range of the ordinal answer (see Table A2 in 
Annex); implicit subjective rate: annual equivalent rate calculated using the maturity and the 
ratio of the number of future hours compared to one hour now; before information relates to 
block B questions; after information relates to block C questions; information delivered 
between the two is the statistical mortality table and the average life expectancy of the 
respondent)  
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Figure 1 – Average estimate of subjective interest rates (Before information) 
(Source: Table 3; fitted using an exponential model) 
After information
y = 0.5491e-0.0539x
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Figure 2 – Average estimate of subjective interest rates (After information) 
(Source: Table 3; fitted using an exponential model) 
 
The fitted term structure of subjective interest rates is calculated using an exponential 
model: tabtr .)( = .9 The estimation is performed on average data from Table 7. The b 
coefficient is the instantaneous subjective interest rate to future free time one second in the 
future. The fitted values are 55% (before and after information). The subjective price of time 
is characterized by a negative slope in the term structure curve. The log of the slope is a 
yearly -5.37% (before information) and -5.39% (after). 
 
Looking at each individual, we transform his ordinal answer to annual implicit 
subjective rates using a correspondence table (see Annex). We corrected outliers particularly 
for wrong answers at question 1 about the relative ratio of one hour in one year. Wrong 
answers above 4 at question B1 (C6) will bias upward the implicit rates and result in 
abnormally high implicit rates. This may be due to a misunderstanding of the question. We 
decided not to remove these answers but to limit the maximum subjective rate to 500%. 
Descriptive statistics of the term structure of subjective interest rates of each respondent are 
given in Table 8. 
                                                 
9
 One parameter hyperbolic fitting gives poor results. 
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Variable              N         average        std. dev.       Minimum      Maximum 
AV1                   228      1.397184      1.713725      0.001000      5.000000 
AV5                   226      0.320404      0.339724      0.001000      1.390116 
AV10                 224      0.184333      0.167918      0.001000      0.546000 
AV20                 222      0.103912      0.084450      0.001000      0.243382 
AV30                 221      0.074331      0.057571      0.001000      0.156298 
AV50                 216      0.048872      0.035622      0.001000      0.091043 
Table 8 - Descriptive statistics for individual subjective interest rates 
(Time horizon 1y, 5y, 10y, 20y, 30y, 50y; source: relative price ratios from questions B1 to 
B6, converted into annual interest rates using the correspondence table A2 in Annex) 
 
Looking at average values, the term structure seems clearly negative. It starts from an 
average 140% for the psychological interest rate for the 1 year horizon. This high figure is 
partly explained by possible errors in understanding the question and by outlier answers that 
have not been removed. At the end of the term structure, the rate is 4.9% for a 50 year 
horizon. 
 
For each individual, we have a six point estimate of his psychological time preference 
structure. We fitted each individual term structure using an exponential two variable model. 
Each individual’s characteristic time preference structure can be defined using a couple of 
parameters, which are the intercept instantaneous interest rate and the slope. Over the whole 
sample, the average estimated parameter for the slope is 0.96 (which corresponds to a log of 
the slope of -3.60% yearly). The average estimates intercept of the exponential model is 0.53 
(i.e. a 53% instantaneous forward interest rate). Results are similar when considering the 
answers to the C questions. 10  
 
When we regress the individual bi estimates of the intercepts and the individual slopes 
ai, we obtain a -0.567 coefficient of correlation. Among individuals, if someone has a strong 
immediate time preference, his long-term time trade-off is smoother with a lower negative 
slope with time horizon. This relationship is confirmed even if we add new information about 
the “true and average” life expectancy. This raw correlation indicates the existence of a 
relationship between the instantaneous forward subjective rate of the two parameters and the 
                                                 
10
 These questions are answered after giving objective information to respondents regarding their life 
expectancy. The average slope parameter is also 0.96 and the average intercept is 0.50. 
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slope of the term structure of time value; however, it does not tell us anything about the form 
of the relationship. The linear form is not the best one. We also tested a log-log form. That 
gives a better fit with an R2 value of 0.573 (correlation of -0.76, see table 9). 
 
 β α 
Estimated coefficient -0.01322 -0.0663 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.5727  
Table 9 – Log-log relationship between individual slope and intercept estimates of subjective 
term structure discount 
(Relation is log(ai) = α +β log(bi) where ai.are term structure slope estimates; bi are 
instantaneous forward rate estimates; tabtr .)( = ; N=216) 
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Figure 3 – Log-log relationship between individual intercepts and slopes 
 
We can draw the two following conclusions: 
- The individual’s term structure of subjective psychological interest is decreasing. 
They are characterized by a couple of parameters corresponding to the instantaneous forward 
interest rate and the decreasing slope of his personal term structure of interest rate. 
- A negative relationship exists between the two parameters defining the term structure 
of subjective rates: an individual with a strong short-term time preference experiences a more 
negative slope. He penalizes the deferred future relatively less compared with an individual 
whose instantaneous short-term interest rate is small.  
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As a result, a behavioral “law” may be formulated: those with a high immediate time 
preference have a relatively less demanding time preference in the deferred future. The 
original time preference hypothesis needs to be conceptualized at a deeper level: the strength 
of that preference does not result in an equal pressure directed toward the future. Time has a 
psychological price, but a term structure exists that unifies the relative prices. This defines a 
“balancing pressure law”: A balancing mechanism spreads over the horizon the pressure for a 
time preference. Regarding the subjective price of time, when someone asks for a lot in the 
very near future, he asks for a relatively lesser amount in the long-term future.  
 
Influence of information on subjective interest rates 
 
Introducing information refers to questions C5-C11, which are similar to questions 
B1-B6. Between the two sets of questions, the respondent is informed of his average 
statistical life expectancy as calculated from the official mortality table. 
 
We form the differences in the subjective interest rates for each horizon of 1 year, 5 
years, 10 years, 20 years, 30 years and 50 years. These differences are subjective interest rates 
calculated before and after new information on the true average life expectancy. We cross 
these differences with individual characteristics. We first used a simple univariate regression 
and then a system of joint estimate to see whether individual features may explain global 
moves in attitude toward time preference. The results were negative. None of the individual 
characteristics appeared to explain changes in attitude toward time. These variables are the 
individual’s characteristics. A multivariate SUR model of the difference of subjective rates 
before and after information for horizons of 1, 5, 10, 20, 30 and 50 years was estimated with 5 
endogenous variables. This gave the same inconclusive results that no individual 
characteristics would influence changes in subjective interest rates. The effect of new 
information on the shape of the term structure of subjective interest rates seems to be random 
and on average null. 
 
We analyzed directly the influence of information on the value of the two parameters 
designing the individual term structure data. After information, the average of individual 
intercepts decreases (50% vs. 53%) and the log of the slope remains on average the same (-
3.60% after vs. -3.60% before). A t-test of the difference between the intercepts before and 
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after rejects the hypothesis of different individual values (t-test=1.26, p-val: 0.21).A test of 
the difference between the ai slope after and before was performed. It also rejects the 
hypothesis of different means (t-test=1.46, p-value:0.51). We do not confirm a significant 
effect of time perception which may alter the decreasing slope of the psychological 
intertemporal discounting. Our results are opposed to those of experiments 3 and 4 made by 
Zauberman et al. (2009). 
  
 Modeling the term structure of subjective interest rates 
 
We characterized the subjective term structure by an intercept (immediate time preference) 
and a slope. We first tested whether a relationship between the intercept interest rate or the 
slope, on the one hand, and 16 specific determinants, on the other, may exist. These larger 
regressions show no strong or significant relationships. We used restricted models with 5 and 
3 explicatives. Results are given in Table 10. 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Constant Gender Risk 
aversion 
Life 
expectancy 
Smoker Education F 
Individual 
slope 
0.9577 0.0144 -0.0025 0.0020 -0.0150 0.0058 2.47 
p-val 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.37 0.08 0.05 0.03 
Individual 
intercept 
0.2220 -0.2861 0.0851 0.0035   4.44 
p-val 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.20   0.00 
Table 10 – Determinants of the term structure parameters 
(OLS regression; gender is a dummy; risk aversion is S23 variable individual 
perceived risk attitude scaled from 1 to 6; statistical life expectancy is calculated using the 
INSEE expectancy table; smoker is a dummy; education is S14 variable from 1(low) to 6(high 
level)) 
 
The slope of the individual subjective price of time does not seem to depend on any 
individual characteristics, but gender. The steepness of the decreasing term structure of 
personal discount rates is lower for women. The regression of the slope on exogenous 
variables such as risk aversion or life expectancy is non-significant. Education and smoking 
status seem to play a role. Smoking is a characteristic already identified in the literature. 
Ceteris paribus, it adds subjective value to long term choices. If we accept the hypothesis that 
smoking status is a proxy for the individual’s perceived life expectancy and wealth we fin 
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results in line with, for instance Ohmura et al. (2005). On the other hand, the level of the 
intercept is a psychological piece of data which interacts significantly with risk aversion and 
gender. This suggests the need for further analysis because these two individual 
characteristics may be related (see below). The level of intercept does not depend on life 
expectancy. The absence of influence of the life expectancy in the two determinants of the 
individual subjective value of time is important. Because the sample is composed with two 
different groups of people with respectively high (students) and low life expectancy (retired 
people) we compared the values of the two sets of slopes and intercepts defining the time 
attitude. The coefficients ai and bi do not follow a normal distribution11. However a test of 
difference between means is significantly rejected either with regard to the slope coefficients 
or the intercept coefficients. 
 
 Retired 
people 
Students 
N 33 183 
Term structure slope   
Average  0.9573 0.9659 
t-test of difference (p-val) -1.06 (0.29) 
Standard deviation 0.0430 0.0457 
Skewness 0.2038 1.0464 
Kurtosis 1.2942 1.1731 
1st quartile 0.9341 0.9352 
3rd quartile 0.9975 0.9975 
Instantaneous future time 
preference 
  
Average 0.4033 0.5530 
t-test of difference (p-val) -1.57 (0.12) 
Standard deviation 0.4818 0.6408 
Skewness 1.6296 1.8695 
Kurtosis 2.7053 6.0949 
1st quartile 0.0104 0.0192 
3rd quartile 0.4942 0.9549 
Table 11 – Difference of subjective term structure parameters between two sub-samples 
(ai.are term structure slope estimates; bi are instantaneous forward rate estimates; individual 
estimates of tabtr .)( =  where r(t) are implicit subjective discount rates based on the B1-B6 
answers to the questionnaire) 
 
Contrary to Von Mises’ hypothesis of dependency with life expectancy, our result 
supports the following conclusion: The term structure of the personal price of time is an 
invariant psychological feature with no tempus fugit effect. 
                                                 
11
 The Jarque-Bera test shows a significant departure from the normal distribution. 
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 Analysis of risk aversion 
 
Risk aversion is tested through three questions. The first two questions compare a 
package resulting from playing a lottery and a certain value. Question S21 tests whether the 
expected uncertain value above the certain one is preferred. Question S22 is the same but the 
expected value is equal to the certain value. Risk averse people should choose the first answer 
(i.e. 0 compared to 1) for this latter question. The average answer to S21 is 0.36. This is 
significantly different from a random 0.5 answer. Looking at question S22, the average 
answer is 0.14. This is also significantly different from 0.5. This latter choice is closer to 0 
than to 1; i.e. it means that the certain value is preferred compared with playing the lottery. 
This is coherent with the risk aversion hypothesis, which asserts that the certain value is 
definitely preferred when the expected value of playing the lottery is equal to the certain 
value. The difference between the two answers S21-S22 is positive (+0.21) and significant.  
 
 S21corr. S22 corr. S21 vs. S22 
N  229 236 224 
average 0.36 0.14 0.21 
std dev 0.48 0.35 0.54 
    
    
t-test -4.33 -15.95 5.91 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Sign test    
Proportion below 0.5 
(above 0) 
0.64 0.86 0.28 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 12 – Risk aversion 
(corr.: corrected to eliminate indifferent answers; question S21 is a comparison of a certain 
value of 10 euros and a lottery with 50% chance to earn 25 euros and 50% chance to earn 
nothing ; question S22 is a comparison of a certain value of 20000 euros and a lottery with 
50% chance to earn 50000 euros and 50% chance to earn nothing ; 0 is certain value, 1 is 
lottery) 
 
We crossed the perception of risk as declared by individuals (question S23) with the 
answers to the lottery questions S21 and S22. We expected that the self-perception of risk 
attitude would be coherent with the risk aversion as measured by the answers about the two 
lotteries. The answers to question S23 range from 1 to 6, with an ordinal value increasing with 
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risk aversion starting from a risk lover’s attitude (1) to that of a risk avoider (6). Rational 
individuals when choosing the lottery will be conscious of taking a risky position compared 
with a no-risk choice. The S23 measurement increases with risk aversion. A logit regression 
of S21 and S22 shows a strongly negative coefficient linked to the risk attitude of S23. The 
coefficients are negative: an increase in risk aversion decreases the choice of the lottery and 
increases the probability of choosing the certain value. The individual’s perception of his risk 
aversion is coherently linked with the lotteries (see Table 13). Individuals are coherent when 
answering with regard to risk. 
 
 Estimated coef p-val Pseudo R2 LR p-val 
Lottery S21      
S23 variable -0.70 0.00 0.17 40.23 0.00 
constant yes     
Lottery S22      
S23 variable -0.42 0.00 0.04 8.35 0.00 
constant yes     
Table 13 – Relation between risk lottery games and perception of risk attitude 
(Logit model with constant; explained variables are lotteries S21 and S22, each with a 0/1 
answer; explicative S23 variable is the perception of one respondent’s attitude toward risk 
from an ordered scale between 1 (risk lover) to 6 (risk averter); LR: likelihood ratio) 
 
An individual’s risk attitudes are crossed with an individual’s characteristics to explain 
risk aversion. As explanatory variables, we introduce cultural and educational elements. A 
binary dummy sets whether the mother tongue of the respondent is French or not. The same 
question is asked regarding the native language of his father and his mother. A dummy 
variable sets whether the location of the individual’s birthplace is France or not. We also 
introduced a similar binary variable in order to find out whether the birthplace of his father 
(and/or his mother) is France.  
 
Variables S21 risky 
lottery 
p-value S22 risky 
lottery 
p-value S23 risk 
perception 
p-value 
S2 – Gender -0.69 0.00*** 0.03 0.92 0.74 0.00*** 
S12 – Smoker -0.44 0.04** -0.70 0.01** 0.11 0.60 
S14 – Education 0.11 0.22 -0.31 0.02** -0.05 0.46 
S15 – Employed/not -0.63 0.40 0.75 0.45 -0.08 0.89 
S16 –Financial 
expenses 
0.06 0.55 0.01 0.94 -0.03 0.70 
S18- Financial 
planning horizon 
-0.10 0.35 -0.26 0.11 -0.11 0.19 
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S19 – Passing 
something on to heirs 
0.44 0.05* 0.48 0.09* -0.22 0.21 
S20 - Size of personal 
capital 
-0.06 0.55 0.05 0.62 -0.12 0.11 
French native 
language/not 
-0.01 0.98 0.26 0.51 0.15 0.60 
Father’s French native 
language  
0.25 0.63 -0.04 0.95 -0.74 0.06* 
Mother’s French 
native language 
-0.35 0.48 0.23 0.72 0.79 0.03** 
Birthplace 
(France/not) 
-0.03 0.92 0.13 0.72 -0.26 0.34 
Father’s birthplace 
(France/not) 
0.04 0.91 0.75 0.20 0.25 0.45 
Mother’s birthplace 
(France/not) 
-0.16 0.66 -1.18 0.02** -0.21 0.43 
Life expectancy 0.01 0.52 0.00 0.96 -0.01 0.42 
LR 18.08 0.20 11.45 0.65 57.81 0.00 
pseudo-R2 0.08  0.05  0.23  
Table 14 – Determinants of risk attitude 
(Dependent variables: playing the lottery S21 and S22, probit model; dependent variable S23 
risk perception, ordered probit model) 
 
Looking at S21 lottery, only two variables seem to explain the risk attitude: gender 
and the wish to pass on something to children. Women were found to choose the certainty 
choice; the lower the wish to pass on something to children, the greater the probability of 
choosing the lottery. The other variables are not significant, especially life expectancy. 
 
Looking at the S22 lottery, the probability of choosing the lottery instead of certainty 
is negatively influenced by non smoker status, by education, and by the fact that the mother 
was born in France. Life expectancy is not significant. These two probit regressions are 
globally very poor considering the whole set of explanatory variables. 
 
The S23 self-perceived risk attitude is explained by gender (women are prone to reject 
risky choices), and by the fact that the mother’s language is French: if yes, the risk is rejected. 
Conversely, if the father’s native language is French, individuals are greater risk lovers.  
Globally the risk attitude is a personal psychological feature and appears to have no 
economical or social determinants such as wealth, employment status or education level. In 
particular, risk attitude does not seem to depend on life expectancy. However, it is linked with 
gender and, at a lower level, with cultural variables such as the fact that the native language of 
the father and the mother is not the same.   
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 Theses results identify gender as a determinant variable in risk aversion attitude. This 
has to be crossed with the result displayed Table 10 where both gender and risk aversion 
appears also to explain significantly the characteristics of the subjective discount rate of 
individuals. We face an endogenuity problem because risk aversion itself is linked with 
gender.  
 
 
5-Determinants of time preference 
 
We will now try to explain the determinant variables of the individual time preference 
curve. 
 
Determinants of relative prices of time 
 
We can analyze directly the individual relative prices of time resulting from a direct 
estimate by an individual. We consider here 6 individual logit models to explain each of the 
variables B1 to B6. We used a large set of control variables. Results are shown in table A3 in 
annex. Gender is highly significant in any of the 6 models, Risk aversion is moderately 
significant. However because of correlation between risk aversion and gender, we cannot 
statute. Another reason to disregard individual Logit model is that individuals are globally 
giving a subjective value to time on the whole horizon they consider. They use a term 
structure of interest rate which is global..  
 
 
We used a conversion factor that eliminates outliers to convert the B1-B6 and the C6-
C11 answers in order to make explicit a continuous trade-off between extra hours of free time 
in future periods. We obtain different values of the implicit subjective interest rate for each 
individual. The transformation of ordered answer into subjective rates chraccterised by 
positive and continuous values allows ti use a paramtric modeling with a continuous 
dependant variable Reference to implicit interest rates allows a limiting of the effect of 
outliers particularly for answers to question B1. We performed a system of 6 simultaneous 
equations to model the individual subjective discount rates for 1, 5, 10, 20, 30 and 50 years 
horizons. The identified endogeneity between explicative variable is modelized with a seventh 
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parametric equation explaining the risk aversion attitude by gender. We estimated a 7 
equations system. 
 
 
 Independent variables 
Dependant 
variables 
Constant Gender Risk 
aversion 
Life 
expectancy 
Planning 
horizon 
R2 
1-AV1 1y 0.36 -0.68 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.05 
p-val 0.55 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.18 0.90  
2-AV5 5y 0.15 -0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 
p-val 0.22 0.01*** 0.05** 0.14 0.96  
3-AV10 10y 0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.06 
p-val 0.08* 0.00*** 0.03** 0.10 0.83  
4-AV20 20y 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.06 
p-val 0.01** 0.00*** 0.11 0.12 0.98  
5-AV30 30y 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.06 
p-val 0.01** 0.00** 0.19 0.06* 0.96  
6-AV50 50y 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.07 
p-val 0.02** 0.01** 0.10 0.03** 0.43  
       
7-Risk 
aversion 
2.82 0.87    0.11 
p-val 0.00*** 0.00***     
Table 15 –Determinants of the relative subjective price of time and risk aversion – 
System of simultaneous equations 
(Dependent variables are subjective interest rates after transformation, equation 1 to 6; 
equation n°7 is risk aversion; multivariate joint estimation of 6 equations) 
 
We obtain the same mix of explicatives: gender risk, risk aversion and, at a lower 
level, life expectancy. Risk aversion is positively significant three times out of six. However, 
risk aversion seems to weight more on the short interest rates. Life expectancy is moderately 
significant and weights on the long-term part of the term structure. So, the question of the 
level and slope of the subjective rates appears important. Gender is clearly confirmed as 
important on the subjective value of time either directly or indirectly through risk aversion.  
The results are less strong if we consider the role of risk aversion. However, the results of the 
multivariate SUR method may be hampered by the fact that the dependant variable in the risk 
aversion equation is not continuous. 
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Panel analysis 
In order to consider the answers to the question globally, we used a panel analysis by 
stacking for each individual his 6 observations. The F-test signals a strong individual effect. 
The means of time relative values are different between individuals.    
 
 Pooled B1-B6 ordinal 
answers 
Pooled subjective interest rates 
1y-50y 
F-stat 1.76 3.50 
degrees 242 242 
p-value 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Table 16 – Test for the individual effect (1458 pooled observations) 
 
We used a panel test with a random method to take into account the individual average 
answer. The random method gives an individual a random effect around a mean value. A 
fixed effect would imply 243 fixed constant coefficients to take into account the individual 
effect. Dependent variable set is pooled AV1-AV50 which eliminates outliers and yield 
continuous dependent variable. Explicatives are limited to horizon maturity, gender, risk 
aversion, life expectancy, planning horizon (S14 variable) and the size of capital (S20 
variable). The first explicative variable refers to the time horizon of the relative subjective 
price of time, i.e. 1, 5, 10, 20, 30 and 50 years. The other explicatives are individual 
characteristics and are deterministic. A Hausman test to distinguish between a fixed and a 
random effect was performed. This did not show any difference in the estimated coefficients. 
The hypothesis of a useful individual fixed is rejected (at the p-value of 0.64). A fixed effect 
is not necessary per se, and we used a random effect model. 
 
 Random effect  Fixed effect  
Explicatives Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Constant 0.72 0.00***   
Horizon 
maturity 
-0.02 0.00*** 0.02 0.54 
Gender -0.15 0.00*** -0.10 0.06* 
Risk aversion 0.05 0.00*** 0.05 0.00*** 
Life expectancy -0.00 0.39 -0.01 0.01 
Planning 
horizon 
0.01 0.82 -0.01 0.61 
Capital -0.01 0.73 -0.00 0.84 
R2 0.44  0.45  
Hausman 0,70 0,64   
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Table 17 – Panel estimates of subjective discount rates AV1-AV50 – Random and 
fixed effects 
(Panel estimates with random individual effects, dependant variables are subjective interest 
rates AV1-AV50 for time horizons from 1 to 50 years using the correspondence table A2 in 
Annex, N=243; independent variables are horizon maturity: 1, 5, 10, 20 30, and 50 years; 
gender: man(0) woman(1); risk aversion attitude from 1 to 6; life expectancy in number of 
years as of 2007; planning horizon from 1 to 4, variable S18; capital: size of personal capital 
from 1(none) to 6(huge), variable S20) 
 
 
Similar analysis should be performed to set the panel equation explaining risk aversion 
with gender. The pseudo R2 of the random effect model is considerably lower. This is not 
confirmed by a significant Hausman test.  
 
 Random effect  Fixed effect  
Explicatives Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Constant 2.90 0.00***   
Gender 0.85 0.00*** 0.78 0.00*** 
R2 0.02  0.22  
Hausman 0,89 0,35   
Table 18 – Panel estimates of risk aversion attitude – Random and fixed effects 
 
The two panel regressions explaining the subjective time value and the risk aversion of 
respondents are estimated jointly. Table 19 presents the results12. 
 
 AV1-AV50 panel 
equation (1) 
 Risk aversion 
panel  
equation (2) 
 
Explicatives Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Constant 0.61 0.00***   
Horizon 
maturity 
-0.02 0.00***   
Gender -0.17 0.00*** 3.72 0.00*** 
Risk aversion 0.05 0.01***   
Life expectancy 0.00 0.32   
Planning 
horizon 
0.01 0.83   
Capital -0.02 0.21   
Table 19 - Two equations panel system estimates  
(Equation 1 is subjective discount rates fir 1 to 50 years time horizon; equation 2 is risk 
aversion attitude; eq(1) is estimated with random effects and equation 2 with fixed effects; 
                                                 
12
 Similar resulats are obtained if we consider anty fixed or random effect in equation  (1) or (2) 
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dependant variables are subjective interest rates AV1-AV50 for time horizons from 1 to 50 
years using the correspondence table A2 in Annex in equation (1) and risk aversion attitude  
in equation (2); N=1458; independent variables are horizon maturity: 1, 5, 10, 20 30, and 50 
years; gender: man(0) woman(1); risk aversion attitude from 1 to 6; life expectancy in number 
of years as of 2007; planning horizon from 1 to 4, variable S18; capital: size of personal 
capital from 1(none) to 6(huge), variable S20) 
 
The coefficient of horizon maturity is negative in the AV1-AV50 dependent variables, 
which is expressed in terms of subjective interest rates. It indicates a term structure of 
subjective interest rates decreasing with the time horizon. Gender is the first characteristic to 
influence individual time preference. Women have a lower time preference and a lower 
subjective value of time. Men are more impatient. Risk aversion is the second psychological 
attitude that influences time preference. Risk averse people will show at the same time a 
stronger time preference. They prefer certainty and, all other things being equal, immediacy. 
On the other hand, risk aversion is per se liked to gender: women are more risk averse than 
men. This conclusion is important on theoretical grounds because it suggests that the two 
dimensions of time preference and risk aversion are not isolated. This result is in line with 
Frederick (2005), who suggests the idea of a common factor behind the time and the risk 
attitude of individuals. Gender may be that common factor insofar as we saw that it is linked 
with risk aversion.  
 
The simultaneous panel regression system deals with the cross correlation feature of 
endogenous variables. As a robustness check, we used also a methodology similar to a double 
least squared estimation. As far as the risk aversion dependant variable in equation (2) is not 
continuous but ordinal it may yield non normal residuals. We estimated equation (2) using a 
Poisson regression model. In a first step we estimated equation (2). We checked the normality 
of residuals and stack them to form a panel vector dragging the individuals risk aversion 
characteristics orthogonal to gender. In a second step, this residual variable is introduced in 
equation (1) instead of the risk aversion variable. The panel estimates leads to results similar 
to those presented table 19. 
  
Limits 
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Our work focuses on pure intertemporal discounting. We do not introduce the 
hypothesis of hyperbolic discounting. We only deals with the objective measure of the time 
delay between two times comparisons. A perception bias may exist in absolute term. Contrary 
to Zauberman et al. (2009) it seems not significant. However this hypothesis is taken into 
account in a relative way with the delivery of an objective piece of new information on the 
time delay. It does not measure explicitly the personal perception of time. However, even if 
the Weber-Fechner law is true, the slope of intertemporal discount rate still remains negative. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This empirical study confirms the decreasing slope of subjective interest rates. 
Individuals use a term structure to discount deferred choice preferences. The psychological 
value of time can be modeled and parameterized using the intercept which is the immediate 
time preference value and the slope of the decreasing subjective interest rates. An exponential 
modeling fits the data successfully. A “balanced pressure law” between these two parameters 
is suggested.  
 
The individual subjective term structure of interest rates seems weakly influenced by 
social or economic characteristics of the individual. Life expectancy does not seem to 
influence the level or the shape of the psychological value of time. We found an absence of a 
tempus fugit effect in the term structure of subjective interest rates. Gender is a variable that 
strongly influences the level of subjective interest rates. The attitude toward risk also 
appeared as a determinant of time preference attitude. These two dimensions seem to interact.. 
This result contradicts the pure intertemporal microeconomic model, which separates the two 
dimensions. This suggests the need to develop further tests to analyze the disentangling 
hypothesis. 
 
As further developments we should test the influence of some dependency 
psychological variables. We referred to smoking, but the literature underlines the role of other 
addictions like…work for of busy executives. Family status may also be considered as a 
single may not face the opportunity of one “free hour” in the same way a family with children 
does. Even if we showed that the downward sloping result is not directly related to the life 
expectancy, an indirect dependency may exist through choice contexts that are themselves 
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linked to the different time episode of human life, i.e. family life, children education, health or 
desease. 
 
 
  
Annex 
 
 
Variables Answers 
S2 – Gender Man(0)-Woman(1) 
S12 – Smoker Yes(0)-No (1) 
S14 – Education 1 to 6 increasing with the level of education 
S15 – Employed/not (1) Employed or would be (i.e. unemployed 
students)-not (0) 
S16 – Financial expenses From 1 to 6 increasing with monthly range of 
expenses 
S18 – Financial planning horizon From 1 to 4 increasing with long term 
planning horizon 
S19 – Passing on something to heirs yes(0)/ no(1) 
S20 – Size of personal capital From 1 to 6 increasing with size 
S23 – Risk attitude From 1 (risk lover) to 6 (risk averter) 
French native language (1) Yes (0) No 
Father’s (yes if French) native 
language  
(1) Yes (0) No  
Mother’s (yes if French) native 
language  
(1) Yes (0) No  
Birthplace  (1) France (0) others 
Father’s birthplace  (1) France (0) others 
Mother’s birthplace  (1) France (0) others 
Life expectancy In years calculated according to the INED 
(French National Institute of Demographic 
Studies) 2007 table of mortality.  
Table A1 – Respondents’ characteristics 
 
 
Horizons 1y 5y 10y 20y 30y 50y 
1 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
2 50.0% 8.4% 4.1% 2.0% 1.4% 0.8% 
3 300.0% 32.0% 14.9% 7.2% 4.7% 2.8% 
4 500.0% 55.2% 24.6% 11.6% 7.6% 4.5% 
5 500.0% 76.2% 32.8% 15.2% 9.9% 5.8% 
6 500.0% 96.1% 40.0% 18.3% 11.9% 7.0% 
7 500.0% 113.2% 46.0% 20.8% 13.4% 7.9% 
8 500.0% 130.5% 51.8% 23.2% 14.9% 8.7% 
9 500.0% 139.0% 54.6% 24.3% 15.6% 9.1% 
Table A2 – Correspondence between the ordinal answers to questions B1-B6 and C6-C11 and 
implicit subjective interest rates 
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(Choice 1 leads to a negative time preference i.e. a negative subjective interest rates, so they 
were set close to a null interest rate; for the one year horizon; choices above 3 have been 
capped; interpolation is carried out looking at the mid-range of the ordinal answer choice1:1h; 
choice 2:1,5h; choice 3:4h; choice 4:9h; choice 5:17h; choice 6:29h; choice 7:44h; choice 
8:65h; choice 9:78h; subjective rates are annual equivalent rates) 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Gender Risk aversion Control LR Pseudo 
R2 
B1 1y -0.93 0.19 yes 42.81 0.18 
 0.00** 1.11  0.00***  
B2 5y -0.76 0.16 yes 29.62 0.13 
 0.02** 0.16  0.01**  
B3 10y -0.88 0.20 yes 42.74 0.18 
 0.00** 0.07*  0.00***  
B4 20y -0.89 0.15 yes 35.76 0.15 
 0.00*** 0.15  0.00***  
B5 30y -0.81 0.15 yes 38.35 0.17 
 0.01** 0.15  0.00***  
B6 50y -0.58 0.19  31.60 0.14 
 0.04** 0.07*  0.00***  
Table A3 – Determinants of the relative subjective price of timeB1-B6 
(Individual ordered logit regressions, Gender, risk aversion and other 13 dependant control 
variables; dependent variables are ordinal answers from 1 to 9 to B1-B6 questions, explicative 
variables are S2 gender, man(0) woman(1); S23 risk aversion attitude from 1 to 6; life 
expectancy in number of years as of 2007; S12: smoker(0) non smoker(1); S14: education 
from 1 self-taught to 6 master’s degree; S16: income level; S18: planning horizon from 1 to 4; 
S19: passing something on to children; S20: size of personal capital from 1(none) to 6(huge); 
native language French(1) no(0); father’s native language French(1) no(0); mother’s 
language: French(1) no(0); birthplace: France(1) no (0); father’s birthplace: France(1) no(0); 
mother’s birthplace: France(1) no(0)) 
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